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Abstract
We examine a deregulation of German pharmacists to assess its eects on retail and labor
markets. From 2004 onward, the reform allowed pharmacists to expand their single-store rms
and to open or acquire up to three aliated stores. This partial deregulation of multi-store
prohibition reduced the cost of rm expansion substantially and provides the basis for our anal-
ysis. We develop a theoretical model that suggests that the general limitation of the total store
number per rm to four is excessively restrictive. Firms with high managerial eciency will
open more stores per rm and have higher labor demand. Our empirical analysis uses very rich
information from the administrative panel data on the universe of pharmacies from 2002 to 2009
and their aliated stores matched with survey data, which provide additional information on
the characteristics of expanding rms before and after the reform. We nd a sharp immediate
increase in entry rates, which continues to be more than ve-fold of its pre-reform level after
ve years for expanding rms. Expanding rms can double revenues but not prots after three
years. We show that the increase of the number of employees by 50% after ve years and the
higher overall employment in the local markets, which increased by 40%, can be attributed to
the deregulation.
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Whether entry regulations serve public or private interest is a controversial issue for competition
policy with consequences for product and labor markets. Such restrictions, which are very common
in dierent countries and industries, potentially aect entries, exits, economies of scope and scale,
prices, and eciency.1 A highly prevalent entry regulation restricts markets at the occupational
level by imposing costs before specic activities may be legally exercised. These restrictions, par-
ticularly frequent among the so-called liberal professions (pharmacists, lawyers, physicians, tax
advisors, etc.) and other service providers are mainly justied with reducing quality uncertainty
and have been shown to limit labor market competition (Kleiner, 2006). The same line of ar-
gument, that is, to prevent undesired eects of competition on quality, is applied to a range of
regulations that restrict rm entry in these occupations. However, there is very little evidence on
the relationship between occupational regulations and the competitive structure of local markets
(Pagliero, 2019).
In this study, we contribute such an analysis by exploiting a deregulation of pharmacists in
Germany to understand its eects on retail and labor markets. The reform substantially reduced
the cost of rm expansion by allowing a single-store pharmacy to open or acquire up to four stores
from 2004 onward. We focus on the easing of the multi-store prohibition in Germany to assess the
eects of deregulating entry restrictions. We evaluate the consequences of this reform for entry,
exit, survival, and market concentration. Moreover, we show its eects on revenues, costs, and
prots as well as labor demand and the occupational choice between self-employment and working
as an employee. Our analysis uses very rich information from administrative panel data on the
universe of pharmacies from 2002 to 2009 and their aliated stores matched with survey data,
which provide information on the characteristics of expanding rms before and after the reform.
Pharmacists in Germany provide an ideal setting to study these eects since access to the
profession, and conduct, remain strictly regulated.2 In this laboratory-like controlled situation,
the multi-store ban was eased in 2004. Opponents of a cap on the number of stores like the
German Council of Economic Experts and the German Monopolies Commission argue that multi-
store prohibition (and third-party ownership ban) prevent the entry of new stores and restrict
pharmacies to have a suboptimal number of stores (German Monopolies Commission, 2008, 2005;
German Council of Economic Experts, 2003).
The European Court of Justice, in contrast, cites the notion of a pharmacy operated by a
pharmacist as a concept to prevent risks to public health (verdicts C-171, 172/07) and views these
regulations as being in line with the EU law. It advocates them as extensions to standard occu-
pational licensing practices. Licensing veries personal experience and diligence by imposing time
and cost-intensive educational requirements. Multi-store prohibition (and third-party ownership
ban) aim to tie personal investments and the professional existence of pharmacists directly to the
operation of the business to make professional misconduct or prot maximization at the cost of
1There is a growing set of extensive studies commissioned by the OECD, the European Commission, and national
governments devoted to this topic. For instance, see von Rueden and Bambalaite (2020); Koumenta et al. (2019);
Paterson et al. (2007); German Monopolies Commission (2005).
2For instance, product quality, prices, fees, mark-ups, the internal organization of rms (legal form) and store
xed costs (through ordinances on quality, size, number, and arrangement of rooms, etc.) and wages (through
collective bargaining). Moreover, non-pharmacist investors are not allowed to own a pharmacy.
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consumers prohibitively costly. Evidence that multi-store prohibition can achieve these goals is
hardly available. On the contrary, Janssen and Zhang (2020) show for the US that independent
pharmacies illegally divert drugs and after being acquired by a chain, a previously independent
pharmacy reduces dispensing of opioids.
The partial lift of these restrictions studied in this paper allows us to provide unconfounded and
precise evidence on key questions of rm dynamics. How do entries, exits, and rm survival evolve
toward the competitive equilibrium and how quickly is it reached. What is the optimal number
of rms in a market, how many stores would they open? Does the liberalization increase overall
employment? The reform of the German pharmacy market, therefore, provides a propitious set-up
to assess the answers to these questions.
We apply two empirical approaches to answer these questions: rst, we quantify the impact of
the policy change with the widely used potential outcomes framework. We contrast outcomes to
several counterfactuals to quantify the impact of the liberalization. Our main base for comparison
are pharmacies that remained single-stores after the reform. We provide evidence that the presence
of multi-stores in the market did not aect single-stores, perhaps through more intense competition.
Moreover, we show, using dierence-in-dierence regressions with general practitioners as a control
group and pharmacists as a treated group, that the main results are supported.
Second, we estimate the relationship of market concentration and employment following an
approach inspired by Bertrand and Kramarz (2002). The basic idea is to describe the association
between the number of multi-stores in a local market and concentration measures on the product
market as well as, in turn, the eect of market concentration on the labor market. The underlying
theoretical mechanism has been described in Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003), where tougher product
market regulation, which they model as a higher cost of entry for new rms, increases market power
for incumbent rms and lowers equilibrium sales and employment. Therefore, one can expect the
liberalization of the pharmacy market to facilitate store foundation and lead to employment growth.
We nd that strong immediate increases in entry rates remain more than ve-fold after ve
years for expanding rms. The overall survival of pharmacies and market concentration decreases
signicantly. Expanding rms double revenues (but not prots after three years), and increase
the number of employees by 50% after ve years and overall employment by more than 40% per
local market. We develop a simple model with market share competition allowing for interlacing
and cannibalization eects consistent with this. Without additional welfare gains though banning
chains, the optimal store number per rm size suggests that the maximum number of four stores is
excessively restrictive. Perhaps surprisingly, rms do not increase personnel after the deregulation
proportionally. This is predicted by our model in which rms with higher (relative) managerial
and organizational eciency decide to open more stores per rm and have under-proportionally
higher labor demand. The implications of our results are that both labor and product market
consequences have to be considered when designing entry regulation.
The article is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a literature review, Section 3 presents
the theoretical model, Section 4 provides a brief insight in the institutional background, Section 5
describes the markets of pharmacies (and physicians). Section 6 species the econometric entry
model, Section 7 discusses the empirical results and the implications for policy reform. Section 8
concludes.
3
2 Entry Regulation: Securing Quality or Hindering Competition?
Our paper contributes to the literature on entries, exits, and market structure in industrial organi-
zation, labor demand and occupational licensing in labor economics, and on the economics of health
care markets. We briey review the theoretical and empirical ndings from the extant literature.
Using town-level data, Schaumans and Verboven (2008) nd no support for entry regulation on
grounds of public interest with entry restrictions reducing the number of pharmacies by more than
50%. Kleiner and Kurdle (2000) show that tougher licensing of practitioners in dentistry does not
improve economic outcomes and leads to slower growth in the number of dentists. The ndings
of Pagliero (2011)'s study on American lawyers supports the capture theory (licensing increases
professional salary via a supply reduction) rather than the public interest theory (licensing as
the solution to the lemons problem of information asymmetry). Timmons (2017) nds support
for broadening the scope of practice in medicare for certain assistant professions as a low-cost
alternative since it can decrease the costs of outpatient care.
Focusing on rm and job creation, Branstetter et al. (2013) analyzes the eects of reducing
entry costs on the reform in Portugal and nd that in the short-term, rm entry and job creation
increased.3 However, similar to the deregulation of 53 crafts professions in Germany studied in
Rostam-Afschar (2014), the increased number of new businesses was mainly due to smaller rms.
For a further reform in Mexico, Kaplan et al. (2011); Bruhn (2011) nd that business start-ups
prot from the deregulation of entry costs and processes, even if the eect is only temporary.
Bertrand and Kramarz (2002), similar to our study of both product and labor market eects, nd
that a stronger entry deterrence increases industry concentration in the French retail industry with
commercial zoning regulation and reduces the employment growth. Using similar methodology,
Sadun (2015) analyzed whether planning regulations aect independent retailers. She nds that
the regulation harms independent retailers since large retail chains adjust store sizes and locations
such that competition for small local retailers increases.
Dunne et al. (2013) investigate dierent types of entry costs and the resulting competitive eects
on entry as well as on prots for so-called Health Professional Shortage Areas (HPSA). They nd
that short-run price competition, the magnitude of entry costs (either sunk for potential entrants or
xed for incumbents) are important components for long-run rm values and the market structure.
The results of Maican and Orth (2018) are in line with these ndings. Long-run prots are aected
by entry regulations, as well as market structure and welfare. In their counterfactual policy exper-
iment, they found that in markets for dierentiated products competition intensity among rms is
aected and, therefore, prots. Further, as a result of increased competition, welfare increases. Im-
plementing licensing fees as entry regulation to protect small stores is counterproductive, however,
markets with liberal regulation perform better.
Finally, Aghion et al. (2008) show that the dismantling of the license Raj in India results in in-
dustry growth, especially in those states with more pro-employer laws.4 Yakovlev and Zhuravskaya
(2013) show that three consecutive liberalization reforms in Russia had a substantial positive eect
3Via a reform that introduced so-called one-stop-shops, which signicantly reduced the costs and the time needed
to register a new business.
4A system that centrally controls entry and output expansion by requiring a license for establishing new factories,
expanding capacities, changing locations, or even starting a new product line.
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on the performance of rms and reduced the informal sector in regions with stronger governance
institutions.
3 A Simple Model of Multi-Store Entry and Market Structure
We develop a simple model of multi-store entry in local markets based on the circular city developed
by Salop (1979) to explore the eects of a reform that allows rms to enter as multi-store rms. We
also consider asymmetric situations by introducing either an exogenous survival rate or positive
eects on consumer utility. However, to keep the model tractable we will derive the outcomes,
that is, market structure and optimal store number, in a symmetric equilibrium and determine the
key factors inuencing the optimal number of stores per rm. To model the competitive eects of
multi-store entry on local markets, location models provide a straightforward setting. The location
choice on the unit circle (see among others Salop, 1979; Pal and Sarkar, 2006; Janssen et al., 2005)
allows us to study the features of competition in markets with localized rivalry.
We explore how the entry of multi-store rms aects the competitive situation in a local market
with the equilibrium number of rms M , the number of stores mi per rm i, the total number of
stores N per local market, and the respective market shares of the rms. We assume that consumers
of mass α live equally distributed on the unit circle, with α accounting for dierent market sizes to
capture local markets with dierences in demand and their inuence on the optimal rm number.
Consumers incur transportation costs according to a quadratic function, which increases with
a transportation cost parameter t in the distance to the next store. Without loss of generality
we normalize the transport cost parameter to one. A representative consumer j's utility when
purchasing at a rm i can be described as
Uj = v̄ − p− (xj − xi)2 + θ(mi), (1)
where v̄ denotes the gross utility from consumption, xj , xi the location of the consumer j and a
rm i, and θ(mi) represents advantages from purchasing from a multi-store, with ∂θ(mi)/∂mi > 0
and ∂2θ(mi)/∂m
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i < 0. Procurement/purchase costs are equal for all rms and are captured in the
xed price level p. Firms only incur xed cost C (per store) and one time entry costs F per rm.
A utility function of this form accounts for additional benets for consumers from purchasing
from multi-store rms in the form of a (non-monetary) additional utility.5 Therefore, assuming
a multi-store rm to be located next to a single-store rm, the indierent consumer in between
these two rms would locate closer to the single-store rm, yielding a higher market share for the
multi-store rm at the expense of the single-store rm.
The additional utility leads consumers to be willing to incur higher transportation costs to
purchase from the multi-store rm. A utility function of this form, therefore, accounts for market
structures with rms preferring interlacing locations instead of a market segmentation (see Janssen
et al., 2005), since in the latter case rms would cannibalize the market shares of their stores. It
also describes asymmetric situations with multi-store rms obtaining over-proportionally increasing
market shares.
5The advantages could stem from faster procurement channels, better chain management or higher bargaining
power. However, these advantages most likely will increase less strongly the higher the number of stores is.
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An asymmetric market situation arises, for instance, due to an exogenous survival rate, that
is, one observes in each period, a share of rms e dropping out of the market. In the particular
case of pharmacists, a drop-out could occur due to retirement or a better outside option, like being
employed as a store manager. As a consequence, a vacancy in the market is created, which can be
protably lled by another rm. Assuming a xed price level and uniformly distributed consumers,
the rms will be located equidistantly to each other. Hence, an external entrant would choose the
same position that the closed rm had occupied to maximize its market share. The more interesting
question is whether it would be protable for an incumbent to open a store to ll in for a vacancy.
For incumbents, incentives to open an aliated store are higher due to the possibility of dividing
the entry cost over both stores, which can account for the successive entrance of aliated stores in
the markets. While single-store rms could open a new single-store rm only as external entrants,
multi-store rms may open aliated stores as incumbents.
To determine the market structure and the equilibrium number of stores per rm, we derive a
symmetric equilibrium of multi-store rms. To keep the analysis tractable we assume no additional
benets, that is, θ(mi) = 0. With uniformly distributed consumers and a xed price level, we
assume that stores locate equidistantly at a distance of 1/N to the next rival store, leaving each
rm i with a market share mi/N where the total number of stores equals the sum of stores per rm
N =
∑M
i=1mi. All rms simultaneously decide on their optimal number of stores. The optimization
problem of a rm i with respect to its number of stores is










−miC − F (2)
with prot π of rm i determined by the wage rate w, price p̄ = p−w/µ and demand given by the
market share and the market size as qi = (αmi)/N . Assuming a linear relation for the production
function with labor as the single input gives qi = µLi, where Li is labor demand and µ represents
the managerial and organizational eciency. Dierentiating the prot function with respect to the
number of stores yields the rst order condition. Assuming all rms to be symmetric in equilibrium,
that is, mi = m−i and consequently N = Mmi, the number of stores per rm (depending on the





The number of entering rms is determined by the zero prot condition, that is, rms decide
to enter the market as long as they obtain non-negative prots π(M) ≥ 0. By substituting m∗ (3)















given the number of rms entering the market and the condition that revenues exceed entry
cost, that is, the condition p̄α > F . The total number of stores is









With N∗ = M∗m0 the symmetric market share is 1M , and with multi-store prohibition, only
single-stores may enter and consequently the total number of stores equals the number of rms NS .





The resulting market share can be calculated as the inverse of the rm/store number NS .
Comparing the single- to a multi-store entry game, for the threshold C <
√
p̄αF − F the number
of independent stores in a multi-store set-up is lower, M∗ < NS , however, the overall number of
stores is higher, N∗ > NS , since rms can divide entry costs over all stores.
In a simultaneous game, rms decide to open stores to increase their market share. If the costs
per store C are rather low, the number of stores per rm m increases, leaving the number of rms
M unaected. Higher entry costs F lead to fewer rms in the market, and therefore, higher market
shares per rm. Consequently, when allowing for a retail structure with multiple stores, the entry
costs can be divided between the stores, leading to a higher number of rms.
The stores will be equally distributed and since all rms are symmetric, we cannot make any
statement about market segmentation or interlacing of stores. However, consumers may prefer a
multi-store market structure due to the higher total number of stores leading to shorter distances
to travel to the next store and, therefore, lower transportation costs.
The optimal number of stores per rm depends on the demand in the local market, that is,
in a market with high demand, (α is large) rms would wish to install more stores. Therefore,
regulating the number of stores per rm to a xed amount independently of the characteristics
of the local market is not desirableneither for rms nor for consumers, given that quality is
exogenously xed.
Considering an initial situation with N single-store rms in the market and allowing them to
open aliated stores in the next period, the rms have incentives to open aliated stores with
the entry cost F being already sunk. However, again the number of optimal stores depends on the
size of the market α and the cost per store C. This can explain that the number of stores reaches
the equilibrium gradually. Substituting the equilibrium store and rm number in the production













The higher the managerial eciency, the higher the equilibrium number of stores per rm m0
and the number of independent rmsM∗. Therefore, we expect rms with higher eciency to open
more stores per rm and consequently be characterized by a higherthough under-proportionally
higherlabor demand. Labor demand increases in the size of the local market and the xed entry
cost. However, rms demand less labor if they are characterized by higher managerial eciency.
The labor demand in a single-store equilibrium is LS = (C + F )/(µp − w) per rm. Only for
markets with very low demand (low α) or very high costs per store (C) the labor demand per rm
can be higher in the single-store equilibrium. Therefore, the liberalization leads to higher labor
demand.
Finally, we briey consider the labor choice of a pharmacist. Each pharmacist has to decide
whether to be the owner of a pharmacy(-chain) or to be employed as a store manager. The phar-
macist will decide to run a pharmacy instead of being employed as long as the expected prots of
the pharmacy(-chain) are higher as the (negotiated) salary of being a pharmacy store-manager.
The predictions one can draw from our theoretical model about the entry reform, i.e. the liberal-
ization of the multi-store ban, can be summarized as follows:
(i) lower entry costs, that is, allowing rms to spread entry costs over more stores leads to
intensied competition between rms due to a higher overall number of stores and, therefore,
decreasing market concentration
(ii) multi-store rms can realize reduced costs per store, that is, experience eciency gains or are
characterized by higher managerial eciency
(iii) by allowing for a multi-store structure labor demand per rm can increase
To summarize, the rms obtain (in a symmetric equilibrium) higher market shares compared
to the single-store equilibrium (extensive margin). However, when the number of stores per rm
increases, each rm obtains smaller market shares (intensive margin) reecting intensied compe-
tition. These ndings are in line with our results from analyzing the data.
4 Multi-Store Prohibition
The pharmacy landscape is widely regulated with the justication that consumers (patients) require
special protection and that pharmaceutical products need to be aordable and available for all
patients. This section briey examines the relevant institutional background, carves out the most
important regulatory institutions for pharmacies, and describes the almost laboratory set-up, which
characterizes the market. While the reforms of the German health care system focused initially on
cost-cutting measures, the government aimed to implement more competition-oriented structural
reforms since 1992.6
Two central pillars of all reforms are the multi-store prohibition and the third-party ownership
banboth driven by the notion of the pharmacist in his pharmacy. In 2004, after repeated re-
quests from pharmacists, competition experts, and some politicians (German Council of Economic
6The relevant reforms are those in 2003 (GKV-Modernisierungsgesetz") and 2007 (GKV-
Wettbewerbsstärkungsgesetz"), see e.g. Gerlinger and Schönwälder (2012).
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Experts, 2002; Bundestag, 2003), the liberalization of the multi-store prohibition took place. Since
this partial liberalization of multiple ownership, pharmacists are allowed to open up to three af-
liated stores in addition to their main pharmacy (German Council of Economic Experts, 2003).
The prohibition of multi-store pharmacies before 2004 avoided the emergence of retail chains of
pharmacies. This prohibition was justied with undesirable competitive situations, that is, chain
formation or highly concentrated markets. The fundamental idea was that a single pharmacy chain
could gain too much market power and lead to a deterioration of the medical supply.
Hence, the question is why the government reevaluated the regulation and decided to allow
multiple ownership (at least insofar that it is allowed to have up to three aliated stores). The
government argued that due to the price (and quality) regulation in combination with the prohibi-
tion of multiple ownership, the pharmacy market indeed lacked necessary competition. Therefore,
the policy change was aimed to intensify competition via cost reductions through the expansion of
pharmacies. Cost-cutting measures can be attained by larger operational units (main pharmacy
with aliated stores) realizing scale eects, that is, the expansion of the pharmacies might lead
to higher exibility in the procurement of drugs and personnel deployment. These are the key
driving factors, which we will analyze in our paper with an examination of whether competition
has enhanced.
The prohibition of ownership by third parties aims to ensure qualitative standards in the provi-
sion of medical supplies and services like the availability of a pharmacist for medical/pharmaceutical
advice and expertise. Pharmacists belong to the group of professions requiring occupational licens-
ing, that is, pharmacists are required to have a license to practice to guarantee the quality of service
provision in the pharmacy. The regulation prevents third parties (e.g. corporations, nancial in-
vestors) from owning pharmacies or even chains.
Further regulations make the pharmacy market a laboratory-like controlled environment. For
instance, the prices of prescription drugs are xed to protect consumers from an exhaustive search
for the cheapest pharmacy.7 Since pharmacies underlie strict regulations concerning the quality
of drugs and the requirements for premises, they compete mainly in market shares, that is, for
consumers. However, compared with other European countries, Germany has a fairly liberal legal
situation concerning the freedom of establishment. Since 1958, pharmacists have the freedom to
choose the location for their pharmacy, their total number is not limited or in any form dependent
on the population. One single exception concerning the geographic location is made concerning the
location of the subsidiary stores. Aliated stores need to be close to the main pharmacy, that is,
in the same or neighboring county.
The development of the German pharmacy market in the last decade is characterized by a
decline in the total number of pharmacies (see ABDA, 2018). Figure 1 shows how the reform in
2004 led to an increase in the total number of pharmacies in the short run. After relaxing the
multi-store ban, pharmacists started to increase the number of stores with new foundations or
acquisitions, a development that resulted in somewhat fewer than 5,000 stores in 2018 (ABDA,
2018). We observe a slightly shrinking number of total pharmacies, which often is referred to more
colorfully as pharmacy extinction. More recently, the number of pharmacies started to decrease
7See Arzneimittelpreisverordnung (AMPreisV). The selling prices of prescription drugs are derived with a xed
percentage surcharge.
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Figure 1: Pharmacy Market in Germany
Notes: Numbers of pharmacies counted at store level.
Datasource: Authors' calculations based on the Business
Register (AFiD-Panel URS).
again: in 2017 the numbers fell below the 20,000 mark for the rst time since 1990. Breaking
the numbers down into the main-/single-store pharmacies and the number of stores, respectively,
makes apparent that the former is declining while the number of stores is increasing (ABDA, 2018).
It seems that the closures outweigh the openings of new pharmacies each year, which leads to the
shrinking number of pharmacies in total.
5 Data and Descriptive Statistics
Our dataset is based on two unique sources that we match to a register and survey panel on rm,
store, and local market characteristics. The rst one is an administrative data panel, the German
business register (AFiD-Panel URS).8 It is a decentralized register that is maintained by the German
Federal Statistical Oces. The register combines data from the German Federal Employment
Agency and scal authorities. Reporting the data is mandatory for all rms in Germany. Due
to the regular annual updating of the register, it is a very detailed data source oering us the
possibility to observe the universe of pharmacists and general practitioners in Germany not only on
rm but also, further disaggregated, at a store-level. We use the AFiD-Panel URS from the very
rst year available in 2002. The data include 579,203 observations over the observation period of
the years 2002 to 2009.9
We extend this rich information by our second data source, which is a survey of rms in the retail
trade sector (AFiD-Panel Retail) compatible with the AFiD-Panel register data, despite its high
8AFiD-Panel URS is short for Amtlichen Firmendaten für Deutschland Panel, Unternehmensregister.
9All observations until 2007 are covered by the industry classications of the German Federal Statistical Oce
(Klassikation der Wirtschaftszweige, Ausgabe 2003, WZ2003), and (Klassikation der Wirtschaftszweige, Ausgabe
2008, WZ2008). We distinguish between pharmacists and general practitioners via the industry branch classications.
Industry codes for Pharmacies are WZ2003: 52310, WZ2008: 47730, and for general practitioners WZ3003: 85121,
WZ2008: 86210.
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quality, not ocially on the program of the German Federal Statistical Oces. It includes 11,990
observations of pharmacists from 2002 to 2006. The trade survey panel draws its sample from the
rms included in the URS. The survey is an unbalanced panel. In each federal state, the industry
branches are clustered by their revenues and within these clusters, a random sample is drawn.
About 8% of all rms are surveyed and supplemented with sampling weights, which we use in our
analysis. In the survey data, we observe pharmacies only at the rm level, however, it provides
additional information to the administrative data like costs (wages, rents, commodity-input).
We need to exclude some observations from the dataset since they are already expired or inac-
tive. Hence, they do not undergo the updating process anymore, but are still listed in the register.
Further, we exclude head-stores, because these units are listed twice, once as an aliated store and
once as head-store itself. Finally, we exclude rms that were multi-stores before 2004, which can
only be possible due to a special permit and is not a result of the deregulation. Some pharmacists
alone were allowed to operate as multi-store with this special operating permit before 2004. A
temporary permit was granted in exceptional cases when there has been a serious undersupply
with pharmaceuticals in a specic region. We drop pharmacies with more than the upper limit of
four stores. The sample restrictions are summarized in Table A.2 in the appendix.
We use these rich data with information on rm- and store-level to analyze the short- and
medium-run eects of the deregulation of the multiple ownership ban on the entry of new rms and
stores, acquisition of stores, exit, and survival rates. We also analyze the eects of this professional
regulation on product-market characteristics such as revenues, costs, and prots, as well as on labor
market outcomes like hiring or ring decisions and wages costs.
For our analysis, we distinguish between pharmacies that stayed single-store over the whole
observation period and pharmacies that either acquired or founded new stores after the deregulation
and transformed to multi-stores. With this denition, we can observe those pharmacies that turn
into multi-stores even before they could decide to acquire or open new stores. Therefore, we can
see whether certain characteristics are inuencing the expansion decision.
5.1 German Pharmacy Market
Figure 2 presents the entry and exit rates of pharmacies. An entry (at store level) is recorded
whenever a new admission in the register is observed. From this, we calculate the entry rates for
single- and multi-store pharmacies. We dene an exit whenever we observe a pharmacy store, which
is expired. The exit rate (overall) and the entry rate of single-store pharmacies seem unaected
by the reform. Consistent with Figure 1, however, entry rates increase after the 2004 lift of the
multi-store prohibition. The entry rate for multi-stores increased to over 15%, which reects either
newly opened stores or acquisitions of existing pharmacies.
Considering that the total number of pharmacies decreases while we can observe more stores
belonging to one pharmacist, we can conclude that competition has intensied due to deregula-
tion. These ndings are in accordance with our theoretical model. Since the group of single-store
pharmacies is signicantly larger than the group of multi-store pharmacies, the overall entry rate
is closer to one of the single-store pharmacies. Thus, the overall entry rate lies below the overall
exit rate of pharmacists. This fact explains the continuous (in our observation window still rather
slow) decrease in overall pharmacy numbers.
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Figure 2: Market Entry and Exit Rates
Notes: We report entry rates for pharmacies becoming multi-stores over the ob-
servation period and those staying single-store. Exit rates are calculated over all
pharmacies independent of store type.
Datasource: Authors' calculations based on the Business Register (AFiD-Panel
URS).
Figure 3: Distribution of Pharmacies across German Counties
(a) Pharmacies (2002-2009) (b) Main pharmacies & stores (2009)
Notes: Data on store and county level.
Datasource: Authors' calculations based on the Business Register (AFiD-Panel URS).
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The spatial distribution of pharmacies across German counties is characterized by a higher
density of pharmacies in the cities, that is, Berlin, Hamburg, or Munich, and urban areas, which
are characterized by a higher population density (higher demand). Some federal states appear to
have a lower density of pharmacies, like Bavaria, Thuringia, Brandenburg, and Rhineland Palatine.
Figure 3 provides an overview of the mean number of pharmacies in Germany by counties over the
observation years.
A similar pattern is visible when considering the distribution of multi-store pharmacies. Fig-
ure 3b depicts the location of the main pharmacies and their stores over Germany in each county
after the reform in 2004. Especially in Northrhine-Westphalia, we observe frequent multi-stores.
Figure 3 shows that the prevalence of pharmacies is comparatively low in Bavaria and much of
Eastern Germany, where many multi-store pharmacies seem to enter markets. In contrast, for
example, in Baden-Wuerttemberg, multi-store pharmacies rather emerge in already densely served
regions.
5.2 Firm and Market Characteristics
Table 1 provides summary statistics for (prospective) multi-store and single-store pharmacies be-
fore and after the reform. We rst discuss rm dynamic outcomes (entries, exits, survival), com-
petition outcomes (market share, revenues, input costs, prots), and nally, labor demand in a
dierence-in-dierences style comparison supplemented with a before-after comparison for concen-
tration measures on the local market level. Comparing the dierences before and after 2004 for
(ex-post) multi-stores, we see substantial increases in entries and exits in columns I through III.
Such eects are virtually absent for single-stores (columns IV through VI).
The impact on competition outcomes seems similarly concentrated almost exclusively among
multi-stores. They could further increase their already larger market shares from 2.8% to 3.5%,
while single-stores remained almost unchanged below 2.0%. There is also a stronger revenue increase
among multi-stores, by more than 50%, whereas they only increase by 20% for single-stores. Input
costs rise only by 30% for multi-stores and at the same time for single-stores by 20%.
However, prots grow at the same rate for both types of pharmacies. This might be due
to higher personnel costs due to increased labor demand. Each aliated pharmacy requires a
pharmacy manager who is in charge of the respective pharmacy. The number of employees increases
by almost ve for multi-stores but remains at the pre-reform level of six for single-stores. In terms
of revenues and employees, pharmacies that turned multi-stores after the reform were already
bigger before the reform, however, the reform has not been conditioned on any of the pre-existing
dierences in outcomes between pharmacies.
Finally, we observe that concentration outcomes measured (CR[10] and Herndahl-index) on
the local market level increased. Concentration measures CR[1] through CR[5] (not reported) also
indicate higher concentration after the reform. We calculate the Herndal-index as well as the
concentration measures with the market shares per rm and aggregate those on county level. In
Table A.1 in the Appendix we provide the greater detail on how we construct this measure.
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
Multi-Store Single-Store
After Before Dierence After Before Dierence
Firm Dynamics
Entry rate 0.102 0.008 0.093*** 0.009 0.012 -0.002***
(0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
14,962 160,501
Exit rate 0.016 0.001 0.015*** 0.019 0.019 0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
14,962 160,501
1-Year survival rate 0.996 0.997 -0.001 0.979 0.979 0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
12,342 14,962
Competition Outcomes
Market share 0.035 0.028 0.007*** 0.019 0.018 0.001***
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
11,099 154,577
Log revenues 7.991 7.466 0.525*** 7.288 7.093 0.195***
(0.008) (0.013) (0.015) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004)
9,785 142,535
Log input costs 7.684 7.373 0.311** 6.869 6.679 0.190***
(0.042) (0.09) (0.100) (0.011) (0.014) (0.017)
623 11,129
Log prots 5.088 5.032 0.055 4.474 4.403 0.072***
(0.072) (0.113) (0.134) (0.017) (0.019) (0.025)
471 9,300
Labor Market Outcomes
Number of employees 13.353 8.668 4.685*** 6.035 5.952 0.082***
(0.132) (0.138) (0.191) (0.014) (0.020) (0.025)
10,103 152,186
Concentration Outcomes (Market Level)
CR(10) 0.516 0.468 0.048***
(0.004) (0.006) (0.007)
3,208
Herndahl-index 0.048 0.041 0.008***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
3,208
Notes: The table evaluates several rm-specic characteristics (rm dynamics, competition outcomes,
and labor market outcomes) dierentiating between multi- and single-stores and concentration outcomes
on the market level in the years before (2002-2003) and after (2004-2009) the deregulation of the multiple-
ownership ban. We distinguish pharmacies that remained single-store over the whole observation period
and pharmacies that became multi-stores at some point. Firm characteristics are reported at a rm
level. The market share is calculated at a rm level per county. Monetary variables measured in Euro
are deated using the drug price index API (Arzneimittelpreisindex). For the detailed description of
variables see Table A.1 in the appendix. Robust standard errors are in parentheses and the number of
observations (observed over 8 years) is presented below. ***Statistical signicance at 0.1%, **signicance
at 1%, *signicance at 5%.




The empirical analysis has two objectives. First, we quantify the impact of the policy change
using the potential outcomes framework. Second, we estimate the relationship of market concen-
tration and employment following an approach inspired by Bertrand and Kramarz (2002), which
we describe in Section 7.4 in more detail. Our basic empirical approach is to compare outcomes
in comparison to several counterfactuals to quantify the impact of the liberalization. Our main
basis for comparison are pharmacies that remained single stores after the reform. However, even
though the descriptive statistics suggest that their situation did not change at all, the presence of
multi-stores in the market could have aected single stores, perhaps through more intense compe-
tition, potentially violating the assumption that the observation on one unit should be unaected
by the particular assignment of treatments to the other units. Therefore, we provide additional
dierence-in-dierence regressions at the store level with general practitioners as a control group,
since they never have been restricted with respect to the number of stores, and pharmacists as
treated group in Section 7.5.
To quantify the impact of the liberalization on pharmacies, we use an event-study style approach
on the pharmacy data to account for pharmacies becoming multi-store at dierent points in time
or not expanding at all. For this, we dene an indicator variable Multi, which is equal to one
at the year of expansion to a multi-store pharmacy and all subsequent years (and zero otherwise).
This specication is similar to the approach used in Branstetter et al. (2013) and identies the
reform impact from the comparison of outcomes within a particular county in years immediately
before the introduction of the multi-store to those in the years immediately after since we include
county-year xed eects. Standard errors for this and all subsequent regressions are clustered at
the county level.
yfitc = τ Multiit + βXfitc + θt + θc + θtc + θi + εfitc,
y is an outcome variable varying over store i and year t in rm f and county c. τ is the treatment
eect on multi-stores. We include store xed eects θi in addition to year, county, and county-year















Applying an event-study approach provides the advantage of accounting for the pharmacies ex-
panding at dierent points in time. To assess the eects of expansion on the market outcomes, we
show the comparisons of dierential trends around the year pharmacists became multi-store. We
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2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Year
(b) 1-Year Survivals
Notes: Dierential time trends for entries around the year of the reform. Data on store-level.
Datasource: Authors' calculations based on the Business Register (AFiD-Panel URS) 2002-2009.
compare expanding pharmacies, that is, those becoming multi-store, to those staying single-store.
In Figure 4a we plot the time trend of entry over the observation period. These results suggest
clearly that multi-store pharmacies drive entries. Although we can observe an increase in the entry
rate for multi-stores after the liberalization, accounting for the full set of xed eects, we cannot
nd higher entry rates in the period before the deregulation. Apparently, expanding pharmacies
were not characterized by higher entry rates before the reform. Further, we nd one-year survival
rates to be decreasing for the pharmacies becoming multi-stores (see Figure 4b). Stores belonging
to a multi-store pharmacy are characterized by a slightly lower survival rate. Two years after the
liberalization, the one-year survival rate starts to decrease signicantly.
The above ndings regarding the entries are in line with the predictions of our theoretical model
concerning the higher number of entering stores when allowing for multi-store rms. When lifting
the multi-store prohibition, entry costs can be divided over multiple stores, and therefore, entry is
simplied for multi-store rms in comparison to single-store rms. The increased number of stores
intensies the competition for market shares, and hence, decreases the probability of each store
surviving.
7.2 Competition Eects
The higher entry rates we found for multi-store pharmacies raise the question of whether they
perform dierently compared to single-store pharmacies on the product marketin other words,
whether we can identify any competitive eects. We nd that the market share of multi-store
pharmacies increases over time in comparison to single-store pharmacies, see Figure 5.
We statistically reject that the point estimate for 2002 is equal to zero, however, one has to
carefully consider the size of the eects shown on the vertical axis, since the dierence between those
multi-store pharmacies and the single stores is economically minuscule and result from ination.
We apply a rather strict assumption regarding the price index and then calculated real revenues
by using the German prescription drug price index API (Arzneimittelpreisindex).10 We used the
10The API is calculated based on prescription drugs that are authorized on the German market and approved by
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API instead of the consumer price index (CPI) since the main part of revenues (about 80%) are
generated in the prescription drug market.11






























2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Year
Notes: Notes: Dierential time trends for market shares around the year of the reform. Data on
rm-level.
Datasource: Authors' calculations based on the Business Register (AFiD-Panel URS) and AFiD
Retail Panel 2002-2009.
After the deregulation, the market shares increased continuously for multi-store rms. The
increase in market share is reected in a similar increase in revenues, see Figure 6a. Regarding
prots, we cannot nd increases as we do for revenues. Figure 6b shows that prots rather growif
at allmuch more slowly and to a substantially smaller extent, perhaps due to (proportionally)
rising costs (wages, rents, and input costs). Note that the rather large, insignicant point estimate
for 2002 is due to substantial revisions in the survey methodology by the Federal Statistical Oce
between 2002 and 2003 and should therefore be interpreted with caution.
To assess the heterogeneity of the treatment eects and the pre-reform dierences in greater
detail, we compare the revenue distributions between single- and multi-store pharmacies over the
years. These product market eects are described by kernel density plots for each year in Figures 7a
and 7b. The gures show, that multi-stores have had already before the reform, higher revenues
on average, mainly due to higher probability mass on the right tail.
Strikingly, Figure 7b shows an instantaneous shift of the revenue distribution, which can be
observed in the years from 2004 to 2005 for multi-stores but not for single stores. The reform not
only aected the right tail but also shifted the left tail because all multi-store pharmacies expanded
to new locations.
Still, it is remarkable that the dispersion of log revenues has not changed much. Note that we
observe small shifts over the years presumably due to ination. These result from over-the-counter
sales for which the CPI applies. In summary, the evidence suggests that i) the reform immediately
the German central organization of the statutory health insurance (GKV, Spitzenverband der Gesetzlichen Kranken-
versicherung).
11This is why we decided not to present the results based on a deation factor weighted from both the API and
the CPI.
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2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Year
(b) Log-Prots
Notes: Dierential time trends for log-revenue around the year of the reform. Data on rm-level.
Datasource: Authors' calculations based on the Business Register (AFiD-Panel URS) and AFiD
Retail Panel 2002-2009.
Figure 7: Impact across the Distribution of Revenues
(a) Density Revenues Single-Store (b) Density Revenues Multi-Store
Notes: Number of employees and revenues counted on rm level. For the kernel density estimation
we used the Epanechnikov kernel.
Datasource: Authors' calculations based on the Business Register (AFiD-Panel URS) 2002-2009.
aected revenues and ii) led to doubling after three years, whereas iii) prots have at best only
slightly been aected. This adds to the ndings of Maican and Orth (2018), where sales in liberal
markets are larger than in restrictive markets.
7.3 Concentration Eects
In this section, we assess one of the key objectives of the liberalization of the multiple-ownership
ban, namely to introduce more competition in local pharmacy markets. In order to investigate
this, we consider the eects of multi-store pharmacies and entries on concentration indicators as
the Herndahl-index or the concentration ratios, accounting for the market concentration and the
market power of the leading pharmacies, respectively.
If the liberalization led to higher competition between the pharmacies we should be able to
see the impact reected in decreasing market concentration. Further, we investigate the eect of
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product market liberalization on employment decisions. In Table 2 we report the eects of the
liberalization of multiple ownership on the concentration of pharmacies in the local markets, that
is, counties.
We estimate the following two panel data regressions, inspired by Bertrand and Kramarz (2002)
to measure i) the relationship of the prevalence of multi-store pharmacies on local market concen-
tration measures and ii) to estimate the relationship of concentration measures and the prevalence
of multi-stores on the number of employees. We use two measures of prevalence of multi-store
pharmacies. First, the number of multi-stores. Second, the share of multi-store rms among all
rms in the local market. We estimate the following speciciation:
Concentrationct = αMulti-Storect + βEntriesct + γXct + θt + θc + εct, (9)
where Concentration is a concentration measure at the local market level (Herndahl-index
or the concentration ratios), Multi-Store and Entriesct denote either the number or the share
of multi-store pharmacies and entries varying over county c and year t. α is the estimate of interest,
Xct includes the number of general practitioners to proxy for demand, θt denotes the year, and θc
country xed eects, and ε is a residual. The second equation links product market competition
to employment in the local market.
Employeesct = δ1Multi-Storect−1 + δ2Entriesct−1 + δ3Concentrationct−1 + βXct + θt + θc + εct, (10)
where Employees is the number of employees in a local market, δ1, δ2 and δ3 are the estimates
of interest. All regressions of equation (9) presented in Table 2 include year xed eects and control
for the number of general practitioners as a proxy for demand. We explore the eect on markets
with multi-store pharmacies alone, hence, excluding markets where no pharmacies expanded during
the observation window to assess the intensive margin of higher numbers of multi-store pharmacies.
In Table 2, we correlate the concentration measures either with the number of multi-stores
(column 1) and the number of entries (column 2) or with the shares of multi-stores (column 3) and
entries (column 4) in the respective county for all outcome values of concentration measures.
We nd that all measures of concentration are negatively related to the liberalization: Deregu-
lating the multiple ownership, that is, allowing the number of stores per pharmacy to increase up
to four in total, decreases the market concentration. We nd this negative eect on the concentra-
tion measures to be signicant for the number of multi-stores in a county as well as for the share
of multi-stores per county. Entry of new pharmacies and a higher entry-share, however, slightly
increase the market concentration, while the eects are all not signicant.
How do these ndings correspond with our ndings from the descriptive statistics, where we
stated that concentration increased? In general, concentration in the market seems to have in-
creased, however, disentangling the eects showed: in markets with multi-store pharmacies a fur-
ther increase of the number of stores per rm decreases the market concentration and, therefore,
fullls the intention of the deregulation by introducing a higher competition intensity and meets
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the predictions of our theoretical model.
Table 2: Impact of Entry Regulation on Concentration
H CR[1] CR[2] CR[3] CR[5] CR[10]
Numbers of rms
Multi-Stores -0.045** -0.088** -0.103*** -0.111*** -0.101*** -0.069**
(0.022) (0.035) (0.037) (0.038) (0.037) (0.031)
Entries 0.034 0.091 0.082 0.076 0.050 0.011
(0.041) (0.075) (0.079) (0.083) (0.082) (0.074)
Shares of rms
Multi- -0.033** -0.096*** -0.089*** -0.097** -0.066* -0.073**
Share (0.016) (0.032) (0.032) (0.035) (0.036) (0.035)
Entry- 0.010 0.050 0.042 0.032 0.016 0.016
Share (0.019) (0.038) (0.045) (0.046) (0.044) (0.036)
No. GP's X X X X X X
Year FE X X X X X X
Observations 1,865 1,865 1,865 1,865 1,865 1,865
Notes: Multi-Stores and Entries correspond to the numbers of multi-store pharmacies
and entries in the market. Multi-Share and Entry-Share correspond to the multi-store
or entry shares in the market. The dependent variables are the Herndahl-index (H) as
the sum of the squares of the market shares in each county or the concentration ratios
cr[n] with n as the corresponding leading market share(s) per county, where [1] is the
largest. All regressions include year xed eects and control for the number of general
practitioners as a proxy for demand. Standard errors clustered at county-level are in
parentheses.
***Statistical signicance at 1%, **signicance at 5%, *signicance at 10%.
Source: Authors' calculations based on the Business Register (AFiD-Panel URS) from
2002 to 2009.
We nd that the reform had signicant eects on the labor market concerning the employment
structure. The number of self-employed pharmacists decreased over the years from 1998 till 2017
while the number of employed pharmacists (including those who are employed as a manager of a
subsidiary pharmacy) increased (see Figure 8). Expanding a pharmacy still requires a pharmacist
in each aliated store, hence, the pharmacist in the pharmacy can be an employed (instead of a
self-employed) pharmacist, explaining the increase in the numbers of employed pharmacists after
2004.
Assessing Figure 8 more closely reveals several key aspects on the link between product market
regulation and labor market outcomes. Before the deregulation in 2004, we observe that the number
of self-employed pharmacists equals the aggregate number of stores as shown in Figure 1. Both
groups, self-employed and employed pharmacists follow parallel trends prior to the policy change.
When the reform became eective, the number of self-employed pharmacists started to steadily
decline by about 3,000matching precisely the number of new aliated stores as shown in Figure 1.
This can be seen as a potential mechanical impact of the reform on the labor market, suggesting that
those single-store pharmacies have been closed perhaps because former self-employed pharmacists
retired or because new multi-store pharmacies hired them as pharmacy managers. Therefore, to
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Pharmacists Employees Self−Employed
Notes: Authors' calculations. Overall number of pharmacists, employees and self-employed.
Datasource: ABDA 1998-2017.
assess the aggregate employment eects of the reform, it is important to take this substitution
eect into account.
In a brief back-of-the-envelope calculation, we assume that all those 3,000 (on average) former
self-employed pharmacists appear as employed pharmacists. With this lower bound, the increase in
employment from about 22,000 before the reform to roughly 31,000 after the reform implies about
6,000 new jobs or an increase in employment of 18% on average.
To explore the general impact of market concentration on employment, we report the results
obtained from estimating specication (10) in Table 3. The dependent variable is the number of
employees in pharmacies per county.12
In all regressions, we control for the number of multi-stores and entries in the year t − 1.
Employment decisions are likely to be made based on the market situation in the year before,
markets with many entries or with a high number of multi-store pharmacies might be in higher need
of personnel. As we will see later on, expanding pharmacies increased their number of employees
step-wise than instantaneously (see Figure 10b). This suggests that it is important to control for
the number of expanding pharmacies and entries in the previous year.
We nd that the eect of multi-stores on employment is positive. At the same time, higher
market concentration is associated with more employment. These eects are economically relevant.
Increasing the market share of the largest pharmacy by ten percentage points leads to six additional
employees. The eect of multi-stores is signicant for all regressions. A higher number of multi-
store pharmacies leads to about three employees more.
12Including all employees subject to mandatory social insurance contribution, hence, including besides employed
pharmacists also personnel like pharmaceutical-technical assistants.
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7.4 Further Labor Market Eects
Disentangling the reform eects on the labor market yields key insights into the dynamics of the
hiring behavior of pharmacies. After the reform, we nd a signicant increase in the number of em-
ployees for multi-store pharmacies, which is not surprising since more stores require more personnel.
However, in contrast to revenues, the number of employees gradually increases. Quantitatively, the
event-study results shown in Figure 9a imply that pharmacists hire about one employee per year
on average. The pre-reform estimate is not statistically dierent from zero.
Table 3: Impact of Concentration on Employment
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI)
Multi-Storest−1 2.940*** 2.935*** 2.935*** 2.929*** 2.916*** 2.887***
(0.485) (0.486) (0.488) (0.491) (0.496) (0.504)
Entriest−1 -0.607* -0.578* -0.593* -0.591* -0.570* -0.531*













Year FE X X X X X X
Observations 2,807 2,807 2,807 2,807 2,807 2,807
Notes: The dependent variable is the numbers of personnel employed as reported in
the URS. We control for Herndahl-index, multi-stores, entries and concentration
ratios in year t− 1. Standard errors clustered at county level are in parentheses.
***Statistical signicance at 1%, **signicance at 5%, *signicance at 10%.
Source: Authors' calculations based on the Business Register (AFiD-Panel URS)
from 2002 to 2009.
Presumably, multi-store pharmacies successively increase the number of employees over the
years due to increased personnel requirements of two or more stores. However, surprisingly we
do not observe a doubling of personnel at the rm level after the deregulation. A reason for this
under-proportional increase of personnel might be either some eciency eects in organizing the
sta or the fact that rms enter the market with smaller stores, which perhaps grow in the longer
term.
From the survey data, we see that over time pharmacies hire more full-time than part-time
employees (not reported), although this evidence is not as clear. Do wage costs increase for phar-
macies with more stores? This could be the case perhaps due to local shortage of supply or overtime
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(b) Log-Wages per Employee
Notes: Authors' calculations. Dierential time trends for employees around the year of the reform.
Data on rm-level.
Datasource: Business Register (AFiD-Panel URS) and AFiD Retail Panel 2002-2009.
pay. In principle, most of the remuneration is based on collective bargaining agreements and the
aggregate supply of pharmacists was rather large in our timeframe. Therefore, we expect to see
no changes in an event-study regression on log-wages per rm. In fact, Figure 9b shows that wage
costs growth remained virtually at zero.13
As with revenues, we nd signicant eect heterogeneity for the group of single-store pharmacies
and the group of multi-store pharmacies regarding their number of employees after the deregula-
tion. Figures 10a and 10b depict the density of employees at rm level in single- and multi-store
pharmacies, respectively. Multi-store pharmacies have had, except for perhaps some representative
pharmacies, on average a similar number of employees before the reform with similar dispersion.
Although the number of employees in single-store pharmacies did not change, we observe a
dynamic and step-wise shift of the mean number of employees for multi-store pharmacies. The
largest shift can be observed from 2003 to 2004 and from 2004 to 2005. In contrast to the impact
on revenues, this shift only aected the right tail of the distribution, increasing the dispersion of
pharmacy size.
In summary, the evidence suggests that regarding the labor market i) the eect of the reform
is rather dynamic and step-wise in contrast to the instantaneous eect in revenues, ii) although
employment increases at the rm level, we nd no doubling of personnel, and iii) wage-cost were
not aected. This leads to the conclusion that employment growth is hindered by entry regulations,
which is in line with the ndings of Bertrand and Kramarz (2002).
7.5 Robustness
The liberalization of the multiple ownership ban constitutes a large reform for pharmacists, having
a major impact on both the labor and product markets of pharmacists. To understand the eects
of the entry reform on market dynamicsentry, acquisition, exit, and one-year survival we apply
a dierence-in-dierences approach. To rule out the possibility that the presence of multi-stores in
13Note that the estimate for 2002 in Figure 9b has to be interpreted with caution due to changes in the survey
methodology between 2002 and 2003.
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Figure 10: Impact across the Distribution of the Number of Employees
(a) Density Employees in Single Store (b) Density Employees in Multi-Store
Notes: Authors' calculations. Number of employees and revenues counted on rm level. For the
kernel density estimation we used the Epanechnikov kernel.
Datasource: Business Register (AFiD-Panel URS) 2002-2009.
a local market might have aected single-store pharmacies, we apply the dierence-in-dierences
approach to compare the outcomes for pharmacists to those of general practitioners before and
after the reform.
General practitioners have been jointly analyzed with pharmacists in studies such as Schaumans
and Verboven (2008) and are a natural comparison group for several reasons. First, trends aecting
pharmacists translate directly to general practitioners, since the demand for pharmaceuticals is
closely tied to the number of prescriptions dispensed. Second, the stable unit treatment value
assumption is likely to hold, since the reform could not aect general practitioners as prices were
exogenously xed and physicians do not have freedom of establishment.14 Third, the absence of
anticipation eects seems also plausible, since the decision whether to become a pharmacist or
a general practitioner cannot be adjusted as a reaction to the reform, since the average time of
more than four years to be admitted as pharmacists or physician exceeds the time span between
announcement and implementation of the reform.
More precisely, we specify
yfitc = τ Pharmacistsit + βXfitc + θt + θc + θtc + θi + εfitc,
where y is an outcome variable varying over store i and year t in rm f and county c. τ is the
average treatment eect (ATE), Pharmacists is a binary indicator equal to one when observing
a pharmacist and zero for general practitioners. Year, county and county-year xed eects are
dened as before in Section 6.
Table 4 reports estimated ATE in ve specications for each market outcome. More precisely,
we run regressions in which the respective outcome variable is estimated as a function of year
eects (all specications) and county eects (specications II-V) to control for unobserved local
heterogeneity. Specications (IV) and (V) additionally include store xed eects to control for
14If supply of medical services exceeds 110%, the Association of Statutory Health Insurance blocks the planning
region for new general practitioners, regardless of whether they would like to work as self-employed or employee.
24
dierences in specic stores.
We nd that entry increases for pharmacists after the liberalization, and also nd a positive
and somewhat smaller trend for acquisitions. In our preferred specications (IV and V), the exit
rate increases for pharmacists. The one-year survival rate of a store increases as well, however,
the survival in the pharmacy market is generally very high. In specication V, we control for rst
dierences instead of xed eects to address the problem of time-invariant unobserved variables.
The results remain virtually unchanged. Overall, they are in line with our main ndings of positive
eects on entries and small changes in exits.
Table 4: Eects on Market Dynamics: Store-Level
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V)
ATE entries 0.024*** 0.025*** 0.027*** 0.034*** 0.024***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.007) (0.001) (0.001)
ATE acquisitions 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.009*** 0.007*** 0.004***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001)
ATE exits -0.006** -0.006** -0.016** 0.010*** 0.007***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.005) (0.001) (0.001)
ATE 1-year survivals 0.005** 0.005*** 0.002 0.034*** 0.026***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.005) (0.001) (0.002)
Year FE X X X X X
County FE X X X X
Store FE X X
First Dierences X
No. GP/county X
Observations 412,224 412,224 53,605 412,224 336,058
Notes: We run all specications for the dierent dependent variables: entry,
acquisitions, exit and one-year survival. All regressions include year xed
eects. In specications (V) and (VI), we control for the number of general
practitioners as a proxy for demand. Standard errors clustered at county level
are in parentheses. The number of observations varies with the dependent
variable. We report the lowest number of observations. Data on store-level.
***Statistical signicance at 0.1%, **signicance at 1%, *signicance at 5%.
Source: Authors' calculations based on the Business Register (AFiD-Panel
URS) from 2002 to 2009.
8 Conclusion
In this study, we use micro-level data on the universe of pharmacies in Germany to investigate
the impact of a reform that liberalized market entry for multi-stores. The deregulation of the
multi-store ban on the German pharmacy market provides a case in point to assess the eects of
deregulating entry. Our results suggest that the reform has increased the acquisition of stores and
entry of new stores substantially in the short and long term. We nd that competition increased,
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resulting in higher exit and lower survival rates, albeit to an economically small extent.
We provide evidence on the characteristics of expanding rms, which have had higher revenues
and more employees already prior to the reform, and show that both revenues and labor demand
increased, while we cannot nd evidence that prots increased. We document that expanding
rms double revenues after three years but do not observe a doubling of personnel. This under-
proportional increase might reect eciency eects in organizing the sta. Finally, we show that
competition intensies in markets where multi-stores exist, but concentration decreases with more
multi-stores.
We view the results as consistent with the theoretical considerations set out in our study. With
a market share competition model inspired by the local rivalry on the unit circle by Salop (1979),
we show that articially suppressing the number of stores may forgo eciency gains and reduce
consumer welfare. The model predicts that the reduction of entry costs aects competition in a
way consistent with our ndings in the data. Restricting the maximum number of stores to a
xed number independent of the characteristics of a local market seems excessively restrictive. We
further can account for the increased labor demand of multi-store pharmacies and show that a
higher (relative) managerial and organizational eciency leads to an increased number of stores
per rm.
On top of this, we show that employment is strongly positively correlated with each concen-
tration measure. This shows that product market competition and labor market outcomes are
intimately linked. In fact, although the reform has directly aected the market structure, we
demonstrate clear evidence that it had important and sizable eects on the labor market. The
policy change increased the number of employees per local market by 40% and led to aggregate job
growth for pharmacists of more than 18%.
Our results can be seen as in line with the eects of occupational licensing, which emphasizes
the ineciencies associated with entry regulation in labor markets. More generally, we cannot
exclude that entry regulations such as the multi-store prohibition serve the private interests of
incumbents. However, these results are from our investigation of competition variables. There was
no attempt to assess the quality of services, which may be an ambitious but important avenue for
future research.
Evaluating the success of the reform shows that it worked as the intended careful partial liberal-
ization. Nevertheless, even if the maximum number of stores remained restricted to four, the gains
were likely quantitatively disproportionally high. This is evident from the characteristics of new
rms induced into the market by the reforms, which strengthened already comparatively ecient
rms. Even though employment at the local market level increased only slightly in absolute terms,
the (unintended) impact on the labor market has been sizable. These results may suggest further
liberalization of the multiple ownership, perhaps also including the admission of third-party own-
ership (German Council of Economic Experts, 2003). However, the higher market concentration
would need to be monitored carefully to prevent monopolization, which could lead to undersupply,
particularly in rural regions. Moreover, in terms of job creation, the impact of future reforms could
be modestat least initially, as since the 2004 reform, new stores start rather small.
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Appendix
A Denition of Key Variables and Sample Restrictions
Table A.1: Denition of key variables
Variable Denition
Entry Indicator for being newly registered on the market.
Acquisitions Indicator for stores of rm i in t and of rm j 6= i in t+ 1.
Exit Indicator variable having been deregistered form the market
1-Year Survival Indicator variable for operating on the market next year.
Market Share We sum up all revenues r realized in county c and year t by all pharmacies n
located in the respective county and divided it by the drug price index (API)





Then, we calculated the individual market share sitc of each pharmacy (on rm
level) in year t and county c by dividing the revenues of pharmacy i by the API







Revenue Taxable revenue from goods and services in 1,000 Euro deated with the drug
price index (API).
Prots Prots calculated from revenues and costs in 1,000 Euro deated with the drug
price index (API).





With si being the market shares of each of the n pharmacies in the market







Employees Number of employees subject to social insurance contributions.
Wages (Gross) wages and salaries in Euro deated with the drug price index (API)
reported by the rm.
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Table A.2: Sample restrictions
AFiD-Panel URS AFiD Retail
Full Sample: 579,203 11,990
Eliminated Remaining Eliminated Remaining
Unit is expired 62,851 516,352 - -
Unit is head-store 6,034 510,318 - -
Unit is inactve 34,413 475,905 - -
Multi-store before 2,004 2,829 473,076 114 11,876
More than four stores 181 472,895 57 11,819
Notes: The observations in the AFiD (URS) panel include the industry sec-
tors of pharmacists (WZ2003: 52310, WZ2008: 47730) and general practi-
tioners (WZ3003: 85121, WZ2008: 86210) over the years 2002 until 2009. The
AFiD Retail panel is an unbalanced panel of pharmacists (WZ2003: 52310)
over the years from 2002 until 2006. If we would observe each pharmacy over
all 5 years, we have 23,190 potential observations.
Sources: Authors' calculations.
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